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ABSTRACT 
  In his 2001 letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders Warren 
Buffett stated, “[Y]ou only find out who is swimming naked when the 
tide goes out.”1 In the fall of 2008, the tide went out when Lehman 
Brothers collapsed and credit markets froze. Left exposed were the 
shoddy—and sometimes fraudulent—practices of participants in the 
theretofore esoteric industry of structured finance. Since then, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has extracted billions of 
dollars in settlements from the industry. A frequent enforcement tool 
of the SEC has been the consent judgment, a hybrid settlement that 
contains injunctive elements. 
  This Note examines the role of the SEC in relation to Article III 
courts, specifically in the context of consent judgments. Drawing on 
the rich history of equitable practice and the doctrine of the separation 
of powers, this Note argues that SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets 
was wrongly decided in that it excessively curtails the role of district 
courts in determining the propriety of equitable relief. The opinion 
not only contradicts longstanding precedent, but also goes too far in 
ceding a core function of the judiciary to the SEC. This Note shows 
that, as a result, the decision serves to undermine fundamental goals 
of the securities laws.  
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 1. Letter from Warren Buffett, Chairman of the Bd. of Dirs., Berkshire Hathaway, to the 
shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway (Feb. 28, 2002), http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/
letters/2001pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/VR2Q-B6LU]. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the run-up to the global financial crisis of 2008, Citigroup 
Global Markets, Inc. (Citi) sold long positions in negatively 
forecasted mortgage-backed assets to investors, in a product known 
as “Class V Funding III” (the Fund).2 Citi claimed that the assets 
comprising the fund were selected by an independent third party, 
when in fact they were selected by Citi itself in an effort to unload 
poorly projected assets.3 Further, and perhaps most egregiously, Citi 
took short positions in the same assets it sold long to investors as part 
of the Fund.4 As a result of this fraud, investors lost over $700 million 
and Citi realized over $160 million in profits.5 
The SEC brought parallel enforcement actions against Citi and 
trader Brian Stoker in October 2011, seeking, inter alia, injunctions 
authorized by Section 20(b) of the Securities Act of 1933.6 District 
Judge Jed Rakoff initially refused to invoke the court’s injunctive 
power to approve a pre-negotiated settlement where the settlement 
was unsupported by facts.7 Both the SEC and Citi took interlocutory 
appeals.8 The Second Circuit, in SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets,9 
ultimately held that Judge Rakoff abused his discretion by refusing a 
settlement between a public agency and a defendant.10 In response to 
Judge Rakoff’s overriding concern that the settlement contained 
 
 2. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup IV), 752 F.3d 285, 289 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 297 (“Although [the allegations] would appear to be tantamount to an allegation 
of knowing and fraudulent intent . . . the S.E.C., for reasons of its own, chose to charge Citi only 
with negligence . . . .” (quoting SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 330 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011))). Judge Rakoff described the SEC’s allegation as that of “a substantial 
securities fraud.” Id. 
 6. See generally SEC v. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d 457, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (providing 
background information and procedural history for both cases); see also Securities Act of 1933, 
15 U.S.C. § 77t (2012) (authorizing the Commission to seek injunctions in the following 
provisions: Section 20(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 21(d) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, Section 209 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and Section 42(d) of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940). 
 7. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup I), 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). 
 8. In an initial appellate decision, the Second Circuit granted a stay sought by both Citi 
and the SEC. Additionally, the panel withheld ruling on the merits and appointed pro bono 
counsel to represent the district court’s position so that the merits panel would have the benefits 
of adversarial briefing. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc. (Citigroup III), 673 F.3d 158, 161 (2d 
Cir. 2012). 
 9. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup IV), 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 10. Id. 
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sparse factual stipulations by which to measure it, the Second Circuit 
proclaimed that “[t]rials are primarily about the truth. Consent 
decrees are primarily about pragmatism.”11 Importantly, the Second 
Circuit held that the SEC is the sole arbiter of what is, or is not, in the 
public interest.12 It thus vacated and remanded Judge Rakoff’s 
decision.13 With the menu so fixed, Judge Rakoff was left “with 
nothing but sour grapes” and thus approved the consent judgment.14 
In SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, the Second Circuit adopted 
a new legal standard that excessively curtails the discretion of district 
courts in evaluating consent judgments between government agencies 
and defendants.15 Although the court boldly claimed that courts 
should not merely “rubber stamp[]”16 the wishes of enforcement 
agencies, it is hard to see how courts that abide by this precedent can 
do anything but passively endorse government settlements. The 
ruling cedes to the SEC the determination of the public interest, 
which is the primary consideration in the decision to grant injunctive 
relief. Consideration of the public interest has historically been a core 
equitable function of the judiciary. The holding therefore contradicts 
precedent and violates the separation-of-powers doctrine. 
This Note demonstrates the flaws of the Citigroup ruling. Part I 
explores the relationship between executive agencies and Article III 
courts as it pertains to judgments and statutory injunctions. Part II 
discusses SEC settlement practices, Judge Rakoff’s initial decision to 
refuse the settlement, and the decision of the Second Circuit in 
Citigroup. Part III draws on discussions from the previous Sections to 
argue that Citigroup was wrongly decided. 
I.  AGENCIES & ARTICLE III COURTS 
At the heart of the issue in Citigroup is a question of the role of 
courts vis-à-vis agencies where consent judgments are concerned.17 
That is, how much discretion do courts retain when an executive 
 
 11. Id. at 295. 
 12. Id. at 296. 
 13. Id. at 298. 
 14. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc., 34 F. Supp. 3d 379, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 15. Citigroup IV, 752 F.3d at 293. 
 16. Id. at 293 (quoting SEC v. Levine, 881 F.2d 1165, 1181 (2d Cir. 1989)).  
 17. See John C. Coffee Jr., Collision Course: The SEC and Judge Rakoff, N.Y. L.J. (Jan. 19, 
2012) (“[Citigroup] poses fundamental questions about the relationship between administrative 
agencies and federal courts.”). 
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agency seeks injunctive relief authorized by statute? This Part 
discusses precedent related to the doctrine of the separation of 
powers and statutory injunctions in an effort to illuminate the 
discussion in Part II. 
A. Against Tyranny: The Doctrine of Separation of Powers 
The Constitution established a government consisting of three 
branches: the legislature,18 the executive,19 and the judiciary.20 The 
branches were not intended to be entirely separate in all of their 
roles, though each was designed to wield certain core functionalities 
that were to be vigilantly guarded against usurpation by other 
branches.21 In this way, the Framers intended to prevent the 
concentration of power in any one branch.22 In Federalist 47, James 
Madison states, “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, 
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or 
many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly 
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”23 In Federalist 51, 
Madison laid out his vision for a system of government in which the 
 
 18. See U.S. CONST. art. I (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”). 
 19. See id. art. II (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States 
of America.”).  
 20. See id. art. III (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.”). 
 21. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 370 (1989) (“[T]he separation-of-powers 
principle, and the nondelegation doctrine in particular, do not prevent Congress from obtaining 
the assistance of its coordinate Branches.”); People v. Owens, 228 P.3d 969, 971–72 (Colo. 2010) 
(stating that “separate branches of government cannot operate in mutually exclusive, watertight 
compartments, but must cooperate with each other”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 101–05 
(James Madison) (Michael A. Genovese ed., 2009) (refuting the idea that the branches of 
government should be entirely distinct while also stating that core functions of each branch 
should not be absorbed by other branches).  
 22. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010) 
(discussing the separation of powers doctrine as it applies to the executive); see also THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 21, at 107 (James Madison) (“It is agreed on all sides, that the 
powers properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely 
administered by either of the other departments. It is equally evident, that none of them ought 
to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others . . . .”). 
 23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 21, at 101 (James Madison). Madison wrote under 
the pseudonym Publius, Latin for “Friend of the People.” Publius was a Roman Consul who 
helped to overthrow the Roman monarchy around 509 BC. ALBERT FURTWANGLER, THE 
AUTHORITY OF PUBLIUS: A READING OF THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 51 (1984). 
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constituent branches both balance and check one another.24 By 
vesting each branch with “opposite and rival interests,” Madison 
believed that the “great difficulty” of creating a government that 
controls the governed as well as itself might be overcome.25 
The functions of the spheres of government are not mutually 
exclusive, and some degree of overlap is essential to the practical 
administration of government.26 Separation-of-powers doctrine is 
inapplicable with respect to purely ministerial or administrative 
functions.27 But one branch violates the doctrine when it usurps the 
powers traditionally vested in another.28 
The Ninth Circuit, in a decision affirmed by the Supreme Court, 
enunciated a clear standard for the separation-of-powers doctrine in 
Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service:29 
[W]e define a constitutional violation of the separation of powers as 
an assumption by one branch of powers that are central or essential 
to the operation of a coordinate branch, provided also that the 
assumption disrupts the coordinate branch in the performance of its 
duties and is unnecessary to implement a legitimate policy of the 
Government.30 
Furthermore, when assumptions of power are sustained and routine, 
a violation is “more easily established.”31 The standard in Chadha was 
largely adopted from Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,32 
where the Supreme Court stated that the coordinate branches of 
government were not intended to be totally independent, and that the 
 
 24. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 21, at 120 (James Madison) (Michael A. 
Genovese ed., 2009) (“But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several 
powers in the same department consists in giving to those who administer each department the 
necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.”). 
 25. Id. 
 26. For a further discussion of overlapping government functions, see supra note 21 and 
accompanying text. 
 27. See Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 424–25 (9th Cir. 1980), aff’d, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) 
(stating that some actions “not implicating a suspect form or degree of power” are undeserving 
of judicial attention). 
 28. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 398–402 (1989) (relying heavily on history 
to inform separation of powers analysis); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel 
Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 603 (1952) (“Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting 
government cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning to the words 
of a text or supply them.”). 
 29. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 30. Id. at 425. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
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locus of the inquiry should be on the degree to which intrusion 
prevents an aggrieved branch from fulfilling its constitutional duties.33 
In Heckler v. Chaney,34 the Supreme Court recognized a 
presumption of unreviewability when an agency declines to initiate or 
pursue an enforcement action.35 Prison inmates convicted of capital 
crimes and sentenced to death by lethal injection alleged that use of 
certain drugs for lethal injection violated the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act36 and sued the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
to prevent their use.37 The FDA declined to take any enforcement 
action.38 The D.C. Circuit held that the FDA’s decision not to pursue 
the inmates’ claims was an abuse of discretion and remanded the case 
so that the FDA would “fulfill its statutory function.”39  
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, began the 
Court’s analysis with the Administrative Procedure Act’s thresholds 
for judicial review of agency enforcement actions: there is a 
presumption of reviewability of agency enforcement actions unless 
review is expressly precluded in the relevant statute or the action is 
committed to agency discretion by law.40 Actions may be deemed to 
be committed to agency discretion when there is “no law to apply.”41 
The Court faulted the D.C. Circuit for its narrow construction of the 
“no law to apply” test in this case because that test is more aptly 
suited for instances concerning affirmative agency enforcement 
actions, as opposed to when an agency chooses not to act.42 The Court 
reminded that it had long recognized a presumption in favor of 
unreviewability when agencies decide not to act.43 
 
 33. See id. (“In designing the structure of our Government and dividing and allocating the 
sovereign power among three coequal branches, the Framers of the Constitution sought to 
provide a comprehensive system, but the separate powers were not intended to operate with 
absolute independence.” (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974))). 
 34. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
 35. Id. at 823. 
 36. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2012)). 
 37. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 823. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 826 (quoting Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). 
 40. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 828; see 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (restricting judicial review 
under the APA in these two scenarios).  
 41. Id. at 830 (quoting Chaney, 718 F.2d at 1184); see also Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, 
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (recognizing actions that are “committed to agency 
discretion” as “very narrow exception[s]” to the general rule of judicial reviewability). 
 42. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831. 
 43. Id. 
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The Court offered three reasons supporting this presumption. 
First, agencies are uniquely situated to balance factors “which are 
peculiarly within [their] expertise,” such as the cost of resources, 
likelihood of success, and opportunity costs.44 Second, decisions not to 
take enforcement actions do not involve “coercive power over an 
individual’s liberty or property rights, and thus [do] not infringe upon 
areas that courts often are called upon to protect.”45 Finally, the Court 
likened a decision not to enforce to a prosecutor’s decision not to 
indict, recognizing a “special province of the Executive Branch” by 
virtue of the Take Care Clause of the Constitution.46 
In Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission,47 Baltimore Gas sued the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) over its decision to settle a regulatory matter 
under the Natural Gas Act48 with Columbia Gas.49 The D.C. Circuit 
read Chaney as based in the separation-of-powers doctrine.50 The 
court held that the power to enforce (or not enforce) the law is vested 
only in the executive branch, and “[w]hen the judiciary orders an 
executive agency to enforce the law it risks arrogating to itself a 
power the Constitution commits to the executive branch.”51 
The central holding in both Chaney and Baltimore Gas was that a 
court, acting alone, cannot compel an agency to act. A natural 
extension of these holdings is their converse: an agency cannot 
compel a court to act. This would seem to be especially true when an 
agency seeks to invoke a central and essential power of the courts, 
and when the relevant statute52 and precedent expressly contemplate 
judicial independence. Otherwise, courts would be relegated to the 
role of a rubber stamper, regardless of the verbiage in which the 
decision is swaddled. 
 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. at 832.  
 46. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832. The Take Care Clause refers to the Executive’s duty to “take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 47. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, 252 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 48. Natural Gas Act, Pub. L. No. 75-688, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 717–717w (2012)). 
 49. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 252 F.3d at 457.  
 50. See id. at 459 (“Indeed, [Chaney’s] recognition that the courts must not require 
agencies to initiate enforcement actions may well be a requirement of the separation of powers 
commanded by our Constitution.”).  
 51. Id. 
 52. See infra note 61 (discussing the relevant language in the Securities Act of 1933); see 
also infra Part III.B (providing the relevant language).  
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The doctrine of separation of powers has specific application 
within the context of statutory injunctions. Although courts might not 
refer to the doctrine by name, the opinions and holdings evince a 
concerted effort to prevent the usurpation of injunctive powers by the 
executive branch.53 
B. Separation of Powers in the Context of Statutory Injunctions 
An early, and still controlling, case on whether agencies are 
entitled to injunctions as a matter of right under a statute authorizing 
injunctive relief is Hecht Co. v. Bowles.54 In that case, the Price 
Administrator of the Office of Price Administration was seeking to 
enforce section 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,55 
which established maximum prices for certain goods.56 The Act stated 
that “upon a showing by the Administrator that such a person has 
engaged or is about to engage in any such acts or practices a 
permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order 
shall be granted without bond.”57 It was undisputed that Hecht, a 
large department store, had violated the substantive provisions of the 
Act.58 The issue before the Supreme Court was whether an injunction 
was mandatory upon proof of a violation of the Act, as the appellate 
court below held.59 
The Administrator urged that he was entitled to injunctive relief 
as a matter of right, per the Act’s plain language.60 In support of this 
position, the Administrator distinguished the language of the Act 
from that of other statutes, including the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 
Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) at issue in 
Citigroup, which he claimed left room for judicial discretion.61 The 
 
 53. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 21, at 103 (James Madison) (“Were [the power 
of the judiciary] joined to the executive power, THE JUDGE might behave with all the violence 
of AN OPPRESSOR.”).  
 54. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944). 
 55. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-421, 56 Stat. 23. 
 56. Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 321–22. 
 57. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 § 205(a), 56 Stat. at 33.  
 58. Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 324 (“There is no substantial controversy over the facts. . . . In its 
answer petitioner pleaded among other things that any failure or neglect to comply with the 
regulation was involuntary and was corrected as soon as discovered.”). 
 59. Id. at 322. 
 60. See id. at 326 (“Respondent insists that the mandatory character of § 205(a) is clear 
from its language, history and purpose.”).  
 61. Id. at 327. Compare Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 § 205(a), 50 U.S.C. App. 
§ 925(a) (1946) (stating that upon a showing of a violation, an injunction shall issue), with 
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Administrator urged the Court to adopt a simple, logical construction 
of the statute: if a violation is proven, then an injunction will issue. 
The Administrator argued that this construction differed from that of 
other statutorily authorized injunctions which included phrases like 
“upon a proper showing,” or “for cause shown,” that imply a more 
discretionary role for courts.62 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court disagreed with the 
Administrator.63 As an initial matter, the Court did not accept that the 
plain language of the Act mandated the issuance of an injunction.64 
The Court said that the language in the Act was a grant of jurisdiction 
to the courts to issue injunctions, not a command to do so.65 At the 
heart of the Court’s opinion was the history of equity practice and 
courts’ traditionally wide latitude to craft equitable orders with 
respect to the individual circumstances of each case.66 The Court 
continued, “The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of 
the Chancellor to do equity and to mold each decree to the necessities 
of the particular case.”67 Moreover, injunctions have always been 
intended to deter future conduct, not to punish past conduct.68 If 
Congress had intended such a drastic break from tradition, the Court 
held, it would have made that intent clear through explicit language in 
the statute.69 Thus, the Court resolved the ambiguity “in accordance 
with . . . traditional practices, as conditioned by the necessities of the 
public interest.”70 The Hecht Court was careful to impress, however, 
that courts should not grant injunctive relief “grudgingly.”71 When an 
agency seeks approval of a consent decree, the propriety of injunctive 
 
Securities Act of 1933 § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2012) (stating that an injunction will issue 
only upon “a proper showing” that the law has been or likely will be broken, thus implicating a 
significant role for the judge who must determine if a proper showing has been made). 
 62. Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 327. 
 63. Id. at 328. 
 64. Id. (“We cannot say that [the court] lacks the power to make that choice. Thus it seems 
that § 205(a) falls short of making mandatory the issuance of an injunction merely because the 
Administrator asks it.”). 
 65. Id. at 329. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. (emphasis added). 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 330.  
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. The Court pointed out that executive agencies and Article III courts are two tools 
that are meant to give effect, “through co-ordinated action,” to the aims of Congress, and that 
courts must exercise their discretion consistent with the underlying purposes of the Act. Id.  
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relief is dictated by concerns of the public interest, not the private 
concerns of the litigants.72 
In Yakus v. United States,73 the Supreme Court again confronted 
the issue of injunctions under the Emergency Price Control Act.74 The 
Court reiterated that the award of an injunction “has never been 
regarded as strictly a matter of right,”75 but rather as a matter of 
“sound judicial discretion.”76 The Court held that when injunctive 
relief would adversely affect the public interest it may rightly be 
withheld, even if such a decision causes injury to the moving party.77 
In closing, the Court impressed that, “[c]ourts of equity may, and 
frequently do, go much further both to give and withhold relief in 
furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go 
when only private interests are involved.”78 
C. Factors Informing Principles of Traditional Equity 
Whereas Hecht and Yakus provide valuable insight into the 
scope of a court’s equitable powers, the following cases are 
illustrative of the factors that inform a court’s decision regarding the 
propriety of injunctive relief. In SEC v. Culpepper,79 the SEC sought 
to enjoin the defendant from further offerings of unregistered stock, 
despite the fact that the defendant had ceased dealing in the 
unregistered stock prior to the SEC’s action.80 The Second Circuit 
held that the cessation of the illegal activities was immaterial,81 but 
that the burden is on the moving party to show “some cognizable 
danger of recurrent violation” due to the prospective nature of 
 
 72. Id. at 331 (“For the standards of the public interest, not the requirements of private 
litigation, measure the propriety and need for injunctive relief in these cases.”). 
 73. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). 
 74. Id. at 418. Petitioners were convicted in the trial court of selling cuts of meat at prices 
above the statutory ceiling. Id. The Emergency Price Control Act established an administrative 
method by which regulations promulgated under the Act could be challenged. Id. Included was 
a provision that disallowed any interlocutory injunctive relief, meaning that a regulation would 
remain in force until there was a full adjudication of the claim. Id. The petitioners claimed that 
the statutory preclusion of interlocutory injunctive relief violated their right to due process. Id. 
The Court disagreed, holding that Congress could permissibly choose to protect the public from 
wartime inflation by precluding interlocutory relief. Id. at 27–28. 
 75. Id. at 440. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. at 441 (quoting Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937)). 
 79. SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959). 
 80. Id. at 245. 
 81. Id. at 250–51. 
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injunctions.82 In assessing the showing by the moving party, “[t]he 
chancellor’s decision is based on all the circumstances; his discretion 
is necessarily broad and a strong showing of abuse must be made to 
reverse it.”83 
Later, in SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers,84 the Second Circuit 
considered a number of factors in assessing the propriety of an 
injunction granted below.85 Generally, the court instructed that, “in 
deciding whether to grant injunctive relief, a district court is called 
upon to assess all those considerations of fairness that have been the 
traditional concern of equity courts.”86 The district court in Manor 
Nursing granted ancillary relief in the form of disgorgement of 
profits.87 The appellants challenged this sanction on the grounds that 
disgorgement of profits, unlike an injunction, was not explicitly 
authorized under the 1933 and 1934 Acts.88 The panel held that courts 
have “general equity powers” under the 1933 and 1934 Acts, 
however, and that “[o]nce the equity jurisdiction of the district court 
has been properly invoked by a showing of a securities-law violation, 
the court possesses the necessary power to fashion an appropriate 
remedy.”89 Such wide-ranging judicial discretion was thus typical in 
the Second Circuit at one time. 
Eight years later, in SEC v. Bonastia,90 the Third Circuit 
announced a list of factors that courts should consider when weighing 
whether to grant injunctive relief.91 The Third Circuit held that the 
court’s determination should ultimately be guided by whether future 
 
 82. Id. at 250 (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)).  
 83. Id. 
 84. SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972). The case involved 
violations of the antifraud provision of the Securities Act of 1933. Id. at 1088.  
 85. See id. at 1100–01 (considering the likelihood of future violations based on past 
violations, the egregiousness of past violations, the degree of remorse, and assurances of future 
compliance). 
 86. Id. at 1102. 
 87. Id. at 1103. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. SEC v. Bonastia, 614 F.2d 908 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 91. See id. at 912–13 (“[A]mong other things, the degree of scienter involved on the part of 
the defendant, the isolated or recurrent nature of the infraction, the defendant’s recognition of 
the wrongful nature of his conduct, the sincerity of his assurances against future violations, and 
the likelihood . . . that future violations might occur.”). The Third Circuit reversed the district 
court, stating that the district court’s myopic view on only one factor, whether the defendant still 
dealt in securities, was an abuse of its discretion. Id. 
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violations were likely based on the totality of the circumstances.92 The 
court determined that the repeated violations committed with 
scienter weighed heavily in favor of an injunction, regardless of the 
petitioner’s current occupation.93 The multifactor framework has been 
applied in other circuits as well.94 The Bonastia panel closed by 
stating, “When a district court refuses to apply well-settled legal 
precepts to a conceded set of facts, it acts outside its allowable 
discretion.”95 
In In re Tutu Water Wells CERCLA Litigation,96 the Third 
Circuit cautioned that before approving a consent judgment under 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),97 a reviewing judge must adjudge 
both the procedural and substantive propriety of the consent 
agreement.98 
In Mitchell v. Hodges Contracting Co.,99 the Secretary of Labor 
sought an injunction authorized by statute against a construction firm 
for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.100 The Fifth Circuit 
held that statutory injunctions do not issue as a matter of right.101 
 
 92. Id.  
 93. See id. at 913 (“[H]ere we have a situation in which the repetitiveness of the violations 
weighs heavily in favor of the imposition of an injunction. Furthermore . . . [the defendant] 
acted with scienter of the violations. That scienter was clearly established underscores the 
propriety of injunctive relief . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 94. See SEC v. Youmans, 729 F.2d 413, 415 (6th Cir. 1984) (considering, in addition to the 
Bonastia factors, “the egregiousness of the violation,” and “the defendant’s age and health”); 
SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1334 (5th Cir. 1978) (“The trial court should consider several 
factors in deciding whether to issue an injunction in light of past violations. The critical question 
in issuing the injunction and also the ultimate test on review is whether defendant's past conduct 
indicates that there is a reasonable likelihood of further violations in the future.”). 
 95. Blatt, 583 F.2d at 1334.  
 96. In re Tutu Water Wells CERCLA Litig., 326 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 97. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012). 
 98. See In re Tutu Water Wells CERCLA Litig., 326 F.3d at 208 (describing the substantive 
inquiry as ensuring that the settlement reflects comparative fault); see also United States v. 
George A. Whiting Paper Co., 644 F.3d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 2011) (stating that consent judgment 
should be approved if consistent with CERCLA, and is substantively and procedurally fair). 
Although a distinction might be made between CERCLA and the securities laws, in Tutu Water 
Wells, substantive consideration was a judge-made requirement. How do we reconcile 
substantive judicial scrutiny where the EPA is concerned and not the SEC?  
 99. Mitchell v. Hodges Contracting Co., 238 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1956). 
 100. See id. at 381 (alleging that the contractor violated work-hour, pay, and recordkeeping 
provisions of the Act). Despite finding the defendant guilty of the violations, the court 
nonetheless, refused to grant an injunction. Id.  
 101. Id. 
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Rather, the decision of whether to issue an injunction and the 
injunction’s terms “must inevitably be left to the sound discretion of 
the judge.”102 The judge’s discretion should be informed by, inter alia, 
the sincerity and candor of the defendant: when these factors have 
been properly evaluated, the decision of the district judge will be left 
undisturbed.103 The Fifth Circuit expanded on this analysis in Mitchell 
v. Bland,104 under similar factual circumstances.105 The court held that, 
even if the panel accepted the Secretary of Labor’s arguments that 
the district court’s findings were erroneous, “the Court would have 
been justified in either granting or denying injunctive relief under the 
broad discretion lodged in it by accepted equitable principles.”106 
Judge Friendly’s opinion in SEC v. Commonwealth Chemical 
Securities,107 in which he cautioned that injunctive relief can have 
significant collateral consequences for firms, exemplifies judicial 
reticence to grant such relief.108 Judge Friendly noted that courts had 
become “more circumspect” in their acquiescence to SEC requests 
for injunctions due to a recognition that injunctions were often more 
than the “mild prophylactic” that they are sometimes described to 
be.109 In denying an injunction against price manipulation, Judge 
Friendly explicitly cited the SEC’s lack of factual basis.110  
Other courts, too, have applied the principle that an injunction 
sought by the SEC can be denied for want of factual evidence. For 
example, in United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp.,111 a 
district court reviewing a consent decree announced a deferential 
standard of review, so long as the court was satisfied of the factual 
underpinnings of the settlement.112 The defendant in Hooker was an 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. See id. at 381–82 (describing the trial judge as the best witness of the parties’ 
demeanors and stating, “[w]here these have been properly evaluated, the action of the Trial 
Court, whether granting or denying an injunction, will be sustained”). 
 104. Mitchell v. Bland, 241 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1957). 
 105. See id. at 809. There, the Secretary of Labor was seeking an injunction for violations of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. The district court refused to issue an injunction. Id. 
 106. Id. at 809–10.  
 107. SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 108. Id. at 99. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. at 100 (“Since we have held the evidence was insufficient to find that Ms. Sharpe 
engaged in or aided and abetted the manipulation, there is no basis for enjoining her with 
respect to conduct of that sort.”). 
 111. United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 540 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 112. Id. at 1072–73. 
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industrial enterprise accused of disposing of 80,000 tons of toxic waste 
in a landfill, creating the potential to contaminate nearby 
waterways.113 The EPA sued Hooker, and soon thereafter the parties 
entered into a settlement containing injunctive relief and monetary 
damages.114 The court, “[r]ecognizing that the resolution of these 
issues by agreement could have tremendous impact upon the 
residents of the community and, indeed, upon all of the surrounding 
areas,” ordered the parties to appear before the court to explain the 
settlement provisions and answer any questions from the court.115 In 
addition, the parties held a public hearing at a local university 
regarding the settlement and held a public notice-and-comment 
period for the settlement, thereby hearing and addressing concerns of 
the general public.116 
After these procedures played out, the court was still 
“convince[d] . . . that many questions remained unanswered and 
[that] many concerns had not been addressed during the prior 
hearing” and thus ordered further hearings “in an attempt to clarify 
the highly technical and complex settlement.”117 After eight days of 
hearings, over two thousand pages of court transcripts, and testimony 
from fifteen expert witnesses, the court was satisfied that the record 
was “complete [and] fully developed.”118 Only after these protracted 
factual inquiries did the court agree to pass judgment on the 
settlement. 
In its assessment of the consent decree, the court in Hooker first 
recognized a “clear policy in favor of encouraging settlements.”119 The 
role of the reviewing court was to “assure itself that the terms of the 
decree are fair and adequate and are not unlawful, unreasonable, or 
against public policy.”120 Further, a court has a “limited duty to 
inquire into the technical terms and factual disputes underlying the 
proposed settlement.”121 In its assessment, a court may consider the 
 
 113. Id. at 1070. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 1071. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 1071–72. 
 119. Id. at 1072 (quoting Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers’ Union, 514 F.2d 767, 
771 (2d Cir. 1975)). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
EDWARDS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2016  10:17 PM 
2016] OF TRUTH, PRAGMATISM, AND SOUR GRAPES 1255 
strength of the plaintiff’s case,122 the good-faith efforts of 
negotiators,123 risks of litigation,124 and whether the putative decree is 
in line with statutory objectives.125 
Not only are facts important to understanding the substantive 
terms of the consent decree as exemplified by Hooker, but facts also 
determine the degree of deference a judge should show an agency 
seeking injunctive relief.126 In FTC v. Standard Financial Management 
Corp.,127 judicial independence was of paramount importance.128 The 
court cautioned against “judicial inertia,” and determined that the 
measure of deference owed to an agency “depends on the persuasive 
power of the agency’s proposal and rationale, given whatever 
practical considerations may impinge and the full panoply of the 
attendant circumstances.”129 Moreover, “rather than blindly following 
the agency’s lead, [a court] must make its own inquiry into the issue 
of reasonableness before entering judgment.”130 The notion that the 
degree of deference is to be determined by the strength of the 
plaintiff’s claims has found traction in other circuits as well.131 Indeed, 
in EEOC v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc.,132 the Seventh Circuit 
declared this to be the most important factor in the decision on a 
consent judgment.133 In this light, Judge Rakoff’s decision in Citigroup 
was far from an abuse of discretion, and instead wholly within the 
mainstream. To Judge Rakoff, the SEC’s case—unsupported by any 
factual stipulations—was weak, and thus the SEC was given relatively 
little deference. 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 1073. 
 126. See FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 408 (1st Cir. 1987) (measuring the 
amount of deference by the strength of the government’s case). 
 127. FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1172 (4th Cir. 1975) (“The most important 
factor to be considered in determining whether there has been such a clear abuse of discretion is 
whether the trial court gave proper consideration to the strength of the plaintiffs’ claims on the 
merits[.]”); see also United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 580–81 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing the 
standard of review for consent decrees); Walsh v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 726 F.2d 956, 
965 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that the most important determination in reviewing a class-action 
settlement was whether it was likely the underlying legal claims could be proven). 
 132. EEOC v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 768 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 133. Id. at 889. 
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Judicial independence is pervasive whenever consent judgments 
are sought. In the antitrust context, FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co.134 is 
illustrative. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) sought a 
preliminary injunction to block a merger it alleged violated antitrust 
laws.135 After acknowledging that the court owed a degree of 
deference to the FTC, the D.C. Circuit maintained that a “judge 
remains obligated to exercise independent judgment on the propriety 
of issuance of a temporary restraining order or preliminary 
injunction. A court does not exercise independent judgment when it 
responds automatically to the agency’s threshold showings. To 
exercise such judgment, the court must take genuine account of ‘the 
equities.’”136 
In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.137 the Supreme Court 
underscored the importance of the fundamental principles of equity.138 
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, stated that the traditional 
considerations of equity must be considered when injunctive relief is 
sought and that no general rule or formula may govern its 
application.139 Upon suing eBay for patent infringement and obtaining 
a favorable verdict, MercExchange had sought to permanently enjoin 
eBay from further infringement.140 The district court refused the 
motion, stating that MercExchange fell within a broad class to which 
injunctive relief was unavailable.141 Invoking a similarly broad brush 
(albeit in favor of issuance), the Federal Circuit reversed and held 
that a permanent injunction should always issue when a patent has 
been determined to be both valid and infringed.142 
The Supreme Court, with eight justices concurring and one 
recusal, rejected categorical rules and injunctions as of right.143 The 
 
 134. FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 135. Id. at 1074. 
 136. Id. at 1082 (citation omitted).  
 137. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 138. See id. at 391–92 (stating that the traditional equity considerations are at play whenever 
permanent injunctive relief is sought, unless Congress explicitly departs from that scheme). 
 139. See id. at 392–93. (“[T]raditional equitable principles do not permit such broad 
classifications.”). 
 140. Id. at 391. 
 141. Id. at 393 (explaining that the district court reasoned that because MercExchange was 
willing to license its patent, and was not itself pursuing the patent, a permanent injunction was 
unavailable). 
 142. Id. at 393–94. 
 143. See id. at 392–93 (stating that blanket rules and principles of equity are irreconcilable). 
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, while Justices Scalia and Ginsburg joined a 
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Court admonished that traditional equity principles are always in 
effect but for an express mandate from Congress.144 In his 
concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts instructed that history is the 
lodestar of equity.145 Although eBay concerned a permanent 
injunction under the Patent Act, Justice Thomas’s language was 
broad and has been interpreted to apply in a variety of contexts.146 
The importance of history in the opinion and its concurrences leaves 
little room for doubt that equitable precedent looms large and should 
not lightly be set aside in the name of pragmatism or deference. 
It is important to note that Congress can, and has from time to 
time, restricted or guided the discretion of courts sitting in equity.147 
Because equity practice has a “background of several hundred years 
of history,”148 however, this is not accomplished without an express 
congressional mandate.149 The best announcement of this notion 
comes from the Supreme Court in Porter v. Warner Holding Co.:150 
[T]he comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is not to be 
denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative 
command. Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and 
 
concurrence by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer joined a 
concurrence by Justice Kennedy. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration of the case. Id. 
at 388. 
 144. See id. at 391–92 (“As this Court has long recognized, a major departure from the long 
tradition of equity practice should not be lightly implied.”). 
 145. Id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“When it comes to discerning and applying those 
standards [of equity], in this area as others, ‘a page of history is worth a volume of logic.’” 
(quoting N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921))).  
 146. It is worth noting that Justice Thomas cited two opinions that did not concern 
intellectual property. Id. at 391 (citing Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982); 
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987)); see also Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 
68, 77–78 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[N]othing in the text or the logic of eBay suggests that its rule is 
limited to patent cases. On the contrary, eBay strongly indicates that the traditional principles of 
equity it employed are the presumptive standard for injunctions in any context.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 147. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (stating that the principles of equity 
jurisdiction will not be forsaken without a clear Congressional mandate); see also Weinberger, 
456 U.S. at 313–14 (“Of course, Congress may intervene and guide or control the exercise of the 
courts’ discretion, but we do not lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from 
established principles.”). 
 148. Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 329. 
 149. See id. at 330 (“We do not believe that such a major departure from that long tradition 
as is here proposed should be lightly implied.”). 
 150. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946). 
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inescapable inference, restricts the court’s jurisdiction in equity, the 
full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied.151 
As demonstrated, equitable practice with regard to statutory 
injunctions has a rich and long history, a history which was largely 
ignored by the Second Circuit in Citigroup. The Second Circuit 
ignored the requirement of a “conceded set of facts,” on which to 
apply “well-settled legal precepts,” which is precisely what Judge 
Rakoff sought.152 Judge Rakoff’s attempts to evaluate the substantive 
propriety of the settlement were frustrated by the granting of the 
power to determine the public interest to the SEC.153 The Citigroup 
holding is antipodean to the proposition in Commonwealth Chemical 
Securities, that an injunction sought by the SEC can be denied for 
want of factual evidence.154 Finally, the rule of the Second Circuit, that 
reviewing courts should generally be satisfied by the SEC’s mere 
averments, stands in stark contrast to the notion of independent 
judgment as described by the D.C. Circuit in FTC v. Weyerhaeuser.155 
The next Part develops these criticisms more formally and argues that 
Citigroup was wrongly decided. 
II.  SEC SETTLEMENT PRACTICES AND THE DECISIONS IN 
CITIGROUP 
SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets did not occur in a vacuum. A 
proper understanding of events and circumstances that preceded the 
suit is critical to a full understanding of the opinion. Although a full 
treatment of the 2008 global financial crisis is beyond the scope of this 
Note, two crisis-related topics are explored below: the SEC’s use of 
 
 151. Id. at 398; see also Brown v. Swann, 35 U.S. 497, 503 (1836) (“The great principles of 
equity, securing complete justice, should not be yielded to light inferences, or doubtful 
construction.”).  
 152. See SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup I), 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (discussing lack of factual basis as the “fundamental[]” reason for denying the consent 
judgment). 
 153. See In re Tutu Water Wells CERCLA Litig., 326 F.3d 201, 206 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(explaining that consent decrees further the public interest if they promote efficient remediation 
of hazardous waste). 
 154. See SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Since we 
have held the evidence was insufficient to find that [the defendant] engaged in or aided and 
abetted the manipulation, there is no basis for enjoining her with respect to conduct of that 
sort.”). 
 155. See FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“Independent 
judgment is not exercised when a court responds automatically to the agency's threshold 
showings. To exercise such judgment, the court must take genuine account of the equities.”). 
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“neither-admit-nor-deny” settlements and the facts underlying 
Citigroup. After that, Section C discusses in depth the Second 
Circuit’s opinion. 
A. “Hallowed by History, but Not by Reason”156: The SEC’s Use of 
Neither-Admit-Nor-Deny Settlements 
The SEC is the principal securities-market conduct regulator in 
the United States.157 In fulfilling its mandate, the SEC has a large 
toolbox of enforcement mechanisms.158 Generally speaking, the SEC 
may bring a civil action in federal court or an administrative action 
before an administrative law judge.159 Irrespective of the forum in 
which an action is initiated, over 90 percent of SEC actions are 
resolved via settlement.160 Commonly, these settlements allow a 
defendant to “neither admit nor deny” wrongdoing.161 Neither-admit-
nor-deny settlements allow a defendant to settle an action without 
having to admit any wrongdoing, while at the same time barring that 
defendant from denying having engaged in unlawful conduct.162 
Neither-admit-nor-deny settlements, although not the only 
 
 156. Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. at 332 (“[T]he S.E.C.’s long-standing policy—hallowed by 
history, but not by reason—of allowing defendants to enter into Consent Judgments without 
admitting or denying the underlying allegations, deprives the Court of even the most minimal 
assurance that the substantial injunctive relief it is being asked to impose has any basis in fact.” 
(footnote omitted)).  
 157. See generally James R. Doty, The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in 
an Internationalized Marketplace, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S77 (1992) (discussing the development 
of the role of the SEC). 
 158. See Danné L. Johnson, SEC Settlement: Agency Self-Interest or Public Interest, 12 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 627, 645 (2007) (discussing the remedies available to the SEC that 
do not require judicial approval, including cease-and-desist orders, suspension/revocation of 
SEC registration, censure, bars from future association broker-dealer or investment adviser, 
pecuniary fines, and disgorgement, among others). 
 159. Id. at 645–46. 
 160. See SEC v. Clifton, 700 F.2d 744, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (providing the 90-percent figure); 
Samuel W. Buell, Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Civil Liability, in PROSECUTORS IN 
THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 87, 92 
(Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011) (“The SEC also settles almost all its 
enforcement actions.”). At least one source has the figure as high as 98 percent. Priyah Kaul, 
Admit or Deny: A Call for Reform of the SEC’s “Neither-Admit-Nor-Deny” Policy, 48 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 535, 536 (2015). 
 161. Examining the Settlement Practices of U.S. Financial Regulators: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 77 (2012) [hereinafter Khuzami] (statement of Robert 
Khuzami, Director of the Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission). 
 162. Johnson, supra note 158, at 647. 
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enforcement tool available to the SEC,163 are commonly used by the 
SEC.164 
The SEC justifies its widespread use of neither-admit-nor-deny 
settlements on the grounds that they are more efficient than litigation 
in terms of time and cost for both the SEC and, generally, the 
defendant.165 These settlements are further justified on the grounds 
that requiring a firm to admit to unlawful conduct could prevent the 
firm from denying such conduct in later actions, thus exposing the 
firm to an unknown amount of future damages in an unknown 
number of future actions.166 Firms would thus be incentivized to 
litigate, and fewer enforcement actions would be brought overall due 
to resource constraints. Courts have generally approved such 
settlements in a wide variety of contexts, not limited to securities 
violations.167 
The practice of allowing neither-admit-nor-deny settlements is 
not without its critics, however.168 Some observers lament that this 
enforcement mechanism lacks potency and credibility.169 More 
damning is the criticism that the SEC is more concerned with fanfare 
 
 163. Since 2011, the SEC has made much use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs), 
in which the SEC agrees to withhold prosecution in exchange for certain concessions, usually 
including the cessation of the activities giving rise to the action. DPAs do not require approval 
or adjudication by a court. See Press Release, SEC, Tenaris to Pay $5.4 Million in SEC’s First-
Ever Deferred Prosecution Agreement (May 17, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/
2011-112.htm [http://perma.cc/E3NJ-UD7D]. 
 164. See Buell, supra note 160, at 89 ( “[T]he ‘neither admit nor deny’ settlement is a fixture 
in SEC practice.”).  
 165. See Khuzami, supra note 161, at 79 (statement of Robert Khuzami) (stating that full 
adjudications in every case would lead to fewer enforcement actions). 
 166. See id. (“The reality is that many companies likely would refuse to settle cases if they 
were required to affirmatively admit unlawful conduct or facts related to that conduct.”); see 
also James B. Stewart, The S.E.C. Has a Message for Firms Not Used to Admitting Guilt, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 22, 2013, at B6 (“If they admit culpability to the S.E.C., plaintiffs will cite that in 
their cases, and that could mean hundred[s] of millions or billions in damages . . . .”).  
 167. Khuzami, supra note 161, at 80–81 (statement of Robert Khuzami) (“In enforcing the 
securities, antitrust, environmental, consumer protection, public health, and civil rights laws, 
federal courts have entered consent judgments in actions resolved by federal agencies . . . .” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 168. See Buell, supra note 160, at 89 (“Does any of this accomplish enough, especially if this 
instance of wrongdoing occurred even though this firm or peer firms were subject to these forms 
of liability in the past?”). 
 169. See id. (“The replacement of a private citizen as plaintiff with the federal securities cop 
adds some gravity to the proceedings, but the routine practice of concluding cases without any 
finding or admission of wrongdoing by the firm may substantially blunt that effect.”). 
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and press conferences than achieving just results.170 A fundamental 
criticism of neither-admit-nor-deny settlements is that enforcement 
carried out on the public’s behalf should do more than fill 
government coffers.171 Professor Samuel Buell writes that “[i]t is 
practically an abdication of responsibility for a public enforcer to 
resolve almost all its cases with no conclusion by the legal process as 
to whether wrongdoing occurred.”172 
It is worth reflecting on the impact of a settlement in which the 
defendant neither admits nor denies wrongdoing on the overall 
objectives of the securities laws. Investor confidence is essential to 
well-functioning markets, and promoting investor confidence was one 
impetus for the 1934 Act.173 Central to investor confidence is a belief 
that enforcement actions will effectively deter future wrongdoing by 
market participants. It is difficult to discern how the deterrence and 
signaling functions of SEC enforcement are fulfilled when neither-
admit-nor-deny settlements are regarded as a mere “cost of doing 
business.”174 Some on the bench have expressed misgivings about this 
type of settlement as well.175 Indeed, in a suit against Bank of America 
(BoA), Judge Rakoff called neither-admit-nor-deny settlements 
“half-baked justice at best.”176 
 
 170. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup I), 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (“It is harder to discern from the limited information before the Court what the S.E.C. is 
getting from this settlement other than a quick headline.”); Buell, supra note 160, at 97. 
 171. See Buell, supra note 160 at 99 (“Regulatory enforcement is pursued on behalf of the 
public, who for good reasons would very much like to be told whether the firm is a lawbreaker 
and, if so, exactly how and to what extent. The public would much prefer to learn this from an 
admission or a careful adjudicatory process than from the mere allegation of it in a federal 
agency’s complaint that, beyond at most a motion to dismiss, is never subject to the scrutiny of 
legal process.”). 
 172. Id. Professor Buell later retreats from this position somewhat, but it is nonetheless 
illustrative of a common criticism of neither-admit-nor-deny settlements. See id. (reflecting that 
he is “being quite unfair” in his criticisms of the SEC’s practices and that “[t]he SEC’s ‘neither 
admit nor deny’ practice has a good rationale”). 
 173. See S. REP. No. 73-1455, at 284 (1934) (discussing investor confidence as essential to 
performance of markets and fluctuations in asset prices, divorced from fundamentals); see also 
James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical 
Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 759 (2003) (describing deterrence of financial fraud as a mission of 
SEC). 
 174. Stewart, supra note 166, at B6.  
 175. See, e.g., SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., Nos. 09 Civ. 6829, 10 Civ. 0215, 2010 WL 624581, 
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010) (granting SEC’s consent motion albeit “shaking its head” at the 
SEC’s “modest and misdirected sanctions” imposed upon a defendant that “trie[d] to escape the 
implications of hiding material information from its shareholders”). 
 176. See id. at *5 (“While better than nothing, this [settlement] is half-baked justice at 
best.”).  
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In SEC v. Bank of America Corp.,177 the SEC alleged that BoA 
lied to its shareholders in a proxy statement.178 In order to achieve 
approval of BoA’s $50 billion acquisition of Merrill Lynch (Merrill), 
BoA’s proxy statement disclosed that Merrill had agreed to withhold 
executive bonuses in the period prior to the closing of the deal.179 
After closing, it came to light that Merrill paid $5.8 billion in bonuses 
to its executives.180 BoA made no corrective disclosure.181 The SEC 
filed a complaint alleging that BoA “materially lied” to shareholders 
and sought a $150 million fine.182 Judge Rakoff was frustrated not only 
because he perceived the penalty as paltry, but also because 
shareholders would be on the hook for the misdeeds of 
management.183  
Judge Rakoff initially refused to approve the consent decree for 
want of factual support. Only after multiple supplemental Statements 
of Fact and “hundreds of pages of deposition testimony and other 
evidentiary materials”184 did Judge Rakoff reluctantly approve the 
settlement.185 Bank of America can thus be seen as foreshadowing 
Citigroup. 
B. Factual and Procedural History of SEC v. Citigroup Global 
Markets 
The story of Citigroup’s ascension to the Second Circuit reads 
like a Shakespearean drama: proceeding in different acts, with 
unlikely alliances, and the ultimate downfall of the protagonist in the 
final act. It is in fair New York, “where we lay our scene.”186 
 
 177. SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., Nos. 09 Civ. 6829, 10 Civ. 0215, 2010 WL 624581 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 22, 2010). 
 178. See id. at *1 (finding that the proxy statement “failed to adequately disclose” details 
about bonus payments). 
 179. See id. (“[A] prudent Bank shareholder, if informed of the aforementioned facts, would 
have thought twice about approving the merger . . . .”). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), 
 183. See id. (“This proposal to have the victims of the violation pay an additional penalty for 
their own victimization was enough to give the Court pause.”). 
 184. Bank of Am. Corp., 2010 WL 624581, at *1.  
 185. See id. at *5 (“While better than nothing, this [settlement] is half-baked justice at 
best.”). 
 186. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO & JULIET act 1, prologue (Cambridge ed., 
University Press 1955) (“In fair Verona, where we lay our scene . . . .”). 
EDWARDS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2016  10:17 PM 
2016] OF TRUTH, PRAGMATISM, AND SOUR GRAPES 1263 
In October 2011, the SEC filed a suit against Citi alleging “a 
serious securities fraud.”187 According to the SEC’s complaint, Citi 
created a billion-dollar fund in the nascent stages of the subprime 
mortgage crisis that it filled with negatively forecasted assets in an 
attempt to rid itself of that exposure.188 In marketing this fund to 
investors, Citi claimed that the constituent assets were selected by an 
independent investment adviser, when in fact the assets were selected 
by Citi itself.189 Citi then took short positions in the same assets that 
were included in the Fund.190 The Fund netted Citi $160 million in 
profits while investors lost more than $700 million.191 
Although the SEC’s complaint alleged the elements of fraud, the 
SEC, “for reasons of its own,” charged Citi only with negligence.192 
The SEC alleged that Citi knew it would have had trouble selling the 
Fund to investors if they had known that the Fund was being used as 
a vehicle for Citi to unload (and short) its poorly projected assets.193 
In a simultaneous filing, the SEC sought the court’s approval of a 
pre-negotiated consent judgment with Citi, including a neither-admit-
nor-deny clause.194 The consent judgment had three primary 
provisions. First, it sought to “permanently restrain[] and enjoin[]” 
Citi from future violations of the same kind. Second, it called for 
disgorgement of $160 million in profits, plus $30 million in interest, 
and an additional $95 million civil penalty. And, third, it called for 
changes to certain internal controls of Citi for a period of three 
years.195 
Even in light of agency deference, the district court concluded 
that it could not approve the consent judgment.196 The court ruled that 
before it can invoke its injunctive powers, it must be satisfied that the 
proposed settlement “is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the public 
interest.”197 The court determined that the putative settlement met 
 
 187. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup IV), 752 F.3d 285, 289 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id.  
 192. Id. at 297.  
 193. Id. at 289. 
 194. Id.  
 195. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup I), 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). 
 196. Id. at 335. 
 197. Id. at 330 (citations omitted). The court continued, 
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none of those requirements.198 The court also cited the public’s 
interest in knowing the truth, as well as the fear of courts becoming 
“mere handmaiden[s]” of government agencies.199 In this regard it is 
critical that Judge Rakoff refused the decree not because he required 
an admission of liability, but because he was provided no facts by 
which to assess the settlement.200 
In particular, Judge Rakoff was curious how the settlement 
amounts were reached and, relatedly, why Citi’s settlement was 
substantially less than an SEC settlement with Goldman Sachs when 
the two firms engaged in similar conduct but Goldman’s was less 
severe.201 Moreover, he wanted to know why important terms and 
remedial measures contained in Goldman’s settlement were not 
included in Citigroup’s, despite Goldman’s cooperation with the 
investigation and Citigroup’s failure to cooperate.202 Earlier in the 
proceedings, Judge Rakoff submitted other questions to the litigants, 
including inquiries into how the SEC ensures compliance with 
injunctions and how many contempt proceedings it has brought to 
enforce such injunctions against large banks.203 The answer was zero.204 
Judge Rakoff further faulted the SEC’s policy of settling actions 
without requiring defendants to admit or deny the underlying 
allegations as “depriv[ing] the Court of even the most minimal 
assurance that the substantial injunctive relief it is being asked to 
 
[I]t is clear that before a court may employ its injunctive and contempt powers in 
support of an administrative settlement, it is required, even after giving substantial 
deference to the views of the administrative agency, to be satisfied that it is not being 
used as a tool to enforce an agreement that is unfair, unreasonable, inadequate, or in 
contravention of the public interest. 
Id. at 332. 
 198. Id. at 332. 
 199. In full, the court stated, 
[W]hen a public agency asks a court to become its partner in enforcement by 
imposing wide-ranging injunctive remedies on a defendant, enforced by the 
formidable judicial power of contempt, the court, and the public, need some 
knowledge of what the underlying facts are: for otherwise, the court becomes a mere 
handmaiden to a settlement privately negotiated on the basis on unknown facts, while 
the public is deprived of ever knowing the truth in a matter of obvious public 
importance. 
Id. 
 200. See Coffee, supra note 17, at 2 (“[The court’s] protest is that it has no information 
about the strength of the case is hardly the same as demanding that the defendant stipulate to 
the allegations in the SEC’s complaint.”).  
 201. Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 334–35 n.7. 
 202. Id. 
 203. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup IV), 752 F.3d 285, 289–90 (2d Cir. 2014).  
 204. Coffee, supra note 17, at 3. 
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impose has any basis in fact.”205 Additionally, he expressed 
displeasure with the fact that settlements of this type are most 
frequently viewed as a mere cost of doing business.206 
As the public interest was concerned, Judge Rakoff cautioned 
that the “successful resolution of [the parties’] competing interests 
cannot be automatically equated with the public interest.”207 In 
particular, the court was concerned not only that Citi got a sweet 
deal,208 but also that defrauded investors would be disadvantaged in 
two related ways should they seek to recoup their losses through 
private litigation.209 Not only are private litigants prevented from 
bringing securities claims based on negligence, but the neither-admit-
nor-deny settlement deprived investors of any collateral estoppel 
assistance.210 
In his concluding remarks, Judge Rakoff cautioned against 
judicial action not based in fact, calling it “inherently dangerous,”211 
and noted that when injunctive power is not based on facts “it serves 
no lawful or moral purpose and is simply an engine of oppression.”212 
Judge Rakoff then refused to enter the settlement and proceeded to 
set a date for trial.213 Both the SEC and Citi took interlocutory 
appeals and filed for a stay of proceedings pending the results of 
those appeals.214 
Judge Rakoff denied the parties’ motions to stay.215 
Unbeknownst to the district court, however, the SEC had filed an 
“emergency motion” in the Second Circuit seeking a stay pending the 
outcome of its interlocutory appeal or, alternatively, a temporary 
 
 205. Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332.  
 206. See id. at 333 (“As for common experience, a consent judgment that does not involve 
any admissions and that results in only very modest penalties is just as frequently viewed, 
particularly in the business community, as a cost of doing business . . . . This, indeed, is 
Citigroup’s position in this very case.”). 
 207. Id. at 335. 
 208. See id. at 333 (“If the allegations of the Complaint are true, this is a very good deal for 
Citigroup; and, even if they are untrue, it is a mild and modest cost of doing business.”); see also 
id. at 334 (describing the $95 million fine as “pocket change” to Citi). 
 209. See id. at 334 (describing how investors were dealt a “double blow”). 
 210. Id.  
 211. Id. at 335. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc. (Citigroup II), 827 F. Supp. 2d 336, 336–37 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). 
 215. Id. at 340. 
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stay.216 In an amazing (if serendipitous) feat of judicial timing, the 
Second Circuit granted the SEC’s motion for a temporary stay in a 
terse per curiam opinion217 just one minute before the district court 
published its opinion denying the parties’ motion to stay.218 
C. Fixing the Menu: The Second Circuit’s Decision 
After a fair amount of procedural skirmishing,219 the Second 
Circuit ultimately held that Judge Rakoff’s refusal to accept the 
settlement between the SEC and Citi was an abuse of discretion.220 
The court’s analysis consisted of three distinct issues: the appellate 
court’s jurisdiction to hear the appeal, the propriety of a consent 
decree being conditioned on an admission of liability, and the level of 
deference owed to the SEC.221 Consistent with the Second Circuit’s 
analysis, the analysis here will focus mainly on the third question. 
1. Did the Second Circuit Have Jurisdiction to Hear the Appeal?  
The panel first considered whether it had jurisdiction to hear the 
interlocutory appeal. The Final Judgment Rule generally limits 
appeals to final dispositions, so as to avoid protracted litigation and 
piecemeal review of litigation.222 But the Final Judgment Rule is not 
without exceptions.223 When lower courts issue interlocutory orders 
 
 216. See id. (explaining that the SEC filed an emergency motion without notification to the 
court and was “seeking a stay pending appeal or, in the alternative, a temporary stay, and 
representing that the motion was unopposed by Citigroup”). 
 217. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc., Nos. 11-5227(L), 11-5242(XAP), 2011 WL 6937373, 
at *1 (2d Cir. Dec. 27, 2011).  
 218. See Citigroup II, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 341 (providing procedural posture). 
 219. Because both the SEC and Citi argued for the stay, the motions panel considered only 
briefs from one side of the dispute. Citigroup III, 673 F.3d 158, 161 (2d Cir. 2012). Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the three-judge panel granted the stay. Id. at 169. First, the panel stated that 
Judge Rakoff gave too little deference to the SEC’s determination of what constituted serving 
the public interest. Id. at 163. Addressing next the district court’s assertion that the grant of 
substantial relief on the basis of allegations was unfair to Citi, the panel held that it is not within 
a court’s purview to protect “private, sophisticated, counseled” parties from settlements to 
which they agree. Id. at 165. Finally, the panel rejected the notion that a court can refuse a 
settlement on the grounds that the settlement does not prove or concede liability. Id. at 166. 
 220. See SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup IV), 752 F.3d 285, 291 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(“A district court abuses its discretion if it ‘(1) based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law,’ 
(2) ‘made a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence,’ or (3) ‘rendered a decision that 
cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.’” (quoting Lynch v. City of New 
York, 589 F.3d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 2009))). 
 221. Id. at 291, 293.  
 222. Id. at 292. 
 223. Id.  
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affecting the status of injunctive relief, and such orders are said to 
have serious or irreparable consequences, interlocutory appeals may 
be allowed.224 When the denial of a settlement is, in effect, the denial 
of injunctive relief, and if the denial will result in irreparable harm if 
left undisturbed, a party is entitled to an interlocutory appeal.225 The 
Second Circuit found that this standard was satisfied.226 First, because 
the consent decree included two types of injunctive relief (a pro 
forma “obey-the-law” injunction, and implementation of certain 
internal-compliance controls), the denial of the consent decree did 
deny the SEC the injunctive relief it sought.227 Second, the SEC 
demonstrated irreparable harm because, in the eyes of the appellate 
court, the district court “expressed no willingness to revisit the 
settlement agreement with the parties, [and] instead [set] a trial 
date.”228 Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that it had jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal.229 
2. Did Judge Rakoff Require an Admission of Liability?  The 
appeals panel disposed of the second issue in a single paragraph. The 
SEC argued that Judge Rakoff abused his discretion by conditioning 
the approval of the consent decree on Citi’s admission of liability.230 
As the district court’s pro bono counsel submitted, however, Judge 
Rakoff did not condition liability on an admission.231 The panel 
accepted the position of the district court’s counsel, “[w]ith good 
reason—there is no basis in the law for the district court to require an 
 
 224. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2012) (granting appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory orders 
“granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or 
modify injunctions”); see Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981) (“Unless a litigant 
can show that an interlocutory order of the district court might have a serious, perhaps 
irreparable, consequence, and that order can be effectually challenged only by immediate 
appeal, the general congressional policy against piecemeal review will preclude interlocutory 
appeal.”). 
 225. Citigroup IV, 752 F.3d at 293. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. The SEC has not enforced a single injunction against a financial institution for over 
a decade. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup I), 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). This leaves one to wonder why the SEC wanted these injunctions.  
 228. Citigroup IV, 752 F.3d at 293. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id.; see Coffee, supra note 17, at 2 (stating that Judge Rakoff conditioned approval not 
on Citi’s admission of liability, but upon lack of facts). This is an important point, as many critics 
of Judge Rakoff’s opinion use this straw man. A pro bono counsel was appointed to argue in 
favor of Judge Rakoff’s opinion because both the SEC and Citi were in favor of approval of the 
consent decree. 
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admission of liability as a condition for approving a settlement 
between the parties.”232 
3. How Much Deference Should Be Afforded to the SEC?  The 
degree of deference owed to the SEC was a “far thornier” issue.233 
The panel first laid out two related background principles: there is a 
“strong federal policy” in favor of consent decrees and, at the same 
time, courts are not “rubber stamps” to the whims of agencies.234 It is 
between these two poles that the sparring took place.235 
The panel next set out to determine the proper standard of 
review. The panel clarified that when a court reviews a consent 
decree involving an enforcement agency, the court should consider 
“whether the proposed consent decree is fair and reasonable.”236 And 
when injunctive relief is included, the court should also ensure that 
“the public interest would not be disserviced.”237 A district court is 
required to enter a consent decree “[a]bsent a substantial basis” that 
one of these elements is violated.238 Missing from the standard 
announced by the court is the requirement of adequacy.239 
The Second Circuit defined the inquiry into the fairness and 
reasonableness of a consent decree as focused on whether the decree 
is procedurally proper.240 A court should also ensure that the decree is 
not the product of collusion or corruption.241 Finally, the baseline 
 
 232. Citigroup IV, 752 F.3d at 293. 
 233. Id. 
 234. See id. (“Our court recognizes a strong federal policy favoring the approval and 
enforcement of consent decrees. To be sure, when the district judge is presented with a 
proposed consent judgment, he is not merely a rubber stamp.”). 
 235. Id. at 294–98. 
 236. Id. at 294. 
 237. See id. (providing that so long as an injunction is not unfair, unreasonable, or, when 
injunctive relief is concerned, when that injunctive relief would not be a disservice to the public, 
consent decrees must be approved).  
 238. Id. 
 239. See id. (reasoning that the adequacy standard was borrowed from settlement review in 
the class action context). In such a context, an adequacy requirement makes sense because 
future claims are barred via res judicata. Id. However, that is generally not the case in the 
context of consent decrees. Id. Plaintiffs with private rights of action are free to bring those 
claims any time, and where no private rights of action exist, “the S.E.C. is the entity charged 
with representing the victims, and is politically liable if it fails to adequately perform its duties.” 
Id. 
 240. See id. at 295 (“The primary focus of the inquiry [into fairness and reasonableness], 
however, should be on ensuring the consent decree is procedurally proper . . . .”). 
 241. Id. at 294–95. 
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legality of the decree, clarity of language, and resolution of 
underlying claims are among the considerations.242 
As to factual support for consent decrees, the Second Circuit 
held that requiring the SEC to establish the veracity of its allegations 
was an abuse of discretion: “Trials are primarily about the truth. 
Consent decrees are primarily about pragmatism.”243 The court then 
engaged in a discussion of the relative merits of consent decrees in 
mitigating risk, uncertainty, and costs associated with litigation.244 
Although the court did not establish any bright-line rule about how 
well supported a consent decree must be, it stated that district courts 
should generally be satisfied by the averments of the SEC, and that 
here the district court had a “sufficient” record on which to approve 
the consent decree.245 Thus in just one paragraph, the Second Circuit 
dispatched the crux of the district court’s concern.246 
In considering the public interest, the court held that “[t]he job 
of determining whether the proposed S.E.C. consent decree best 
serves the public interest, however, rests squarely with the S.E.C., and 
its decision merits significant deference.”247 In support of this 
proposition, the panel offered that federal judges have no 
constituency, whereas executive agencies have a congressional 
constituency.248 The panel then confronted Judge Rakoff’s public-
interest inquiry, and determined that “the district court made no 
findings that the injunctive relief proposed in the consent decree 
would disservice the public interest, in part because it defined the 
public interest as ‘an overriding interest in knowing the truth.’”249 To 
the Second Circuit, this was an improper inquiry and thus constituted 
legal error.250 
 
 242. Id. 
 243. See id. at 295 (“It is an abuse of discretion to require, as the district court did here, that 
the S.E.C. establish the ‘truth’ of the allegations against a settling party as a condition for 
approving the consent decrees.”). 
 244. Id. 
 245. See id. at 295–96 (stating that “colorable claims, supported by factual averments” 
provide sufficient basis for approval of consent). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 296 (emphasis added).  
 248. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 
(1984)).  
 249. Id. at 297 (quoting the district court’s opinion). 
 250. See id. (explaining that whereas a district court cannot find the public interest disserved 
based on a policy disagreement with the SEC, it could, for example, find the public interest 
disserved if the consent decree barred private causes of action). 
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The Second Circuit went on to state that the decisions about 
which causes of action to charge against particular defendants were 
entirely within the purview of the SEC.251 And further, for a district 
court to withhold approval of a consent decree because it did not 
believe the proper charges were brought constituted an abuse of 
discretion.252 
Finally, the panel pointed out that the SEC is free to carry out its 
enforcement efforts through administrative channels, outside the 
reach of Article III courts.253 The panel cautioned hollowly that if the 
SEC seeks to invoke the equitable powers of courts, “then the S.E.C. 
must be willing to assure the court that the settlement proposed is fair 
and reasonable.”254 The court closed its analysis by restating the 
(equally hollow) rubber-stamp motif: “For the courts to simply accept 
a proposed S.E.C. consent decree without any review would be a 
dereliction of the court’s duty to ensure the orders it enters are 
proper.”255 
III.  CONFRONTING THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S DECISION 
The decision of the Second Circuit in Citigroup is flawed in at 
least two respects. First, the decision patently violates the separation-
of-powers doctrine by granting the SEC far too much power to 
determine the propriety of an injunction. Second, it ignores 
longstanding precedent regarding the role of courts with respect to 
equitable relief. This Part analyzes both of these objections. 
A. Separation of Powers: Ceding a Central Function 
In Citigroup, the Second Circuit’s holding grants to the SEC a 
function central and essential to the judiciary, and thus violates the 
separation-of-powers principle.256 Namely, the decision permits the 
SEC to be the arbiter of the public interest: “The job of determining 
 
 251. See id. (defining the SEC’s sphere of jurisdiction). 
 252. Id. Again, this seems to be a straw man. It is no mistake the panel appended this phrase 
with “to the extent.” See id. (“To the extent the district court withheld approval of the consent 
decree on the ground that it believed the S.E.C. failed to bring the proper charges against 
Citigroup, that constituted an abuse of discretion.” (emphasis added)). 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 298. 
 256. See Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 425 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[W]e define a constitutional 
violation of the separation of powers as an assumption by one branch of the powers that are 
central or essential to the operation of a coordinate branch . . . .”).  
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whether the proposed S.E.C. consent decree best serves the public 
interest, however, rests squarely with the S.E.C., and its decision 
merits significant deference.”257 Given that the primary consideration 
in injunctive relief is consideration of the public interest, the SEC 
may now decide for itself when injunctive relief is warranted. 
After Citigroup, the decision to grant or deny injunctive relief is 
only nominally a decision for the courts. Professor John Coffee, 
writing before the decision of the Second Circuit came down, 
reasoned that the only way the court of appeals could reverse Judge 
Rakoff would be to declare that the SEC has the “sole discretion” to 
determine when injunctive relief is warranted.258 That is precisely 
what the Second Circuit held. 
The decision is also disruptive to the judiciary and prevents 
judges from discharging their duties, meeting the standard set out in 
Nixon for finding a separation-of-powers violation.259 Article III of the 
Constitution explicitly vests equity power in the courts.260 There is no 
indication courts are unsatisfactory or ill-situated in this regard. On 
the contrary, hundreds of years of equitable precedent provide 
compelling reason to conclude that courts take this responsibility 
seriously and discharge this duty to effect just and reasonable 
outcomes. Citigroup, however, all but places the courts’ equity powers 
with the SEC in the context of securities enforcement. Courts are thus 
confined in their own use of equitable powers, resulting in the loss of 
a key constitutionally granted function. 
Equitable relief is precisely the sort of central and essential 
power contemplated in Nixon and Chadha. Equitable relief has been 
a crucial tool of the courts in a number of contexts including 
 
 257. See Citigroup IV, 752 F.3d at 296. 
 258. See Coffee, supra note 17, at 3. Coffee states that  
[t]he only basis on which the Second Circuit could seemingly grant the requested 
relief . . . would be to find that the SEC, and not the district court, has the sole 
discretion to determine whether a proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, adequate 
and in the public interest. To date, even though the SEC is entitled to deference, the 
case law does not go anywhere near this far. 
Id. 
 259. See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (“[T]he proper inquiry 
focuses on the extent to which [another branch’s act] prevents the Executive Branch from 
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.”).  
 260. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law 
and equity . . . .”). The Constitution provides that the “judicial power of the United States, shall 
be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to 
time ordain and establish.” Id. 
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antitrust,261 desegregation,262 and prison reform.263 Without such 
equitable powers, court-issued mandates would lack potency and 
credibility. Equitable powers, the “formidable” power of contempt 
among them, are those that give court decisions their “bite” and are 
thus critical to the judiciary.264 The decision of the Second Circuit 
ignores this truth and pegs the court’s equitable powers to the desires 
of the SEC. 
B. Ignoring Hecht and Its Progeny 
One of the more striking features of the Second Circuit’s opinion 
is the fact that it contains scant treatment of precedent. This is true of 
controlling precedent from the Supreme Court and the Second 
Circuit, as well as persuasive precedent from other circuits. Despite 
the Second Circuit’s nonchalance on this point, precedent is very 
informative of the dispute in Citigroup. 
Like Hecht, the analysis begins with the relevant statutory 
language.265 The SEC brought its case against Citi under the 1933 
Act.266 Section 20(b) of that Act provides for statutory injunctions: 
Whenever . . . any person is engaged or about to engage in any acts 
or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of the 
provisions of this subchapter, or of any rule or regulation prescribed 
under authority thereof, the Commission may, in its discretion, bring 
an action in any district court of the United States . . . to enjoin such 
acts or practices, and upon a proper showing, a permanent or 
temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted without 
bond.267 
 
 261. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 101–05 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(discussing injunctions in the antitrust context). 
 262. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (“In fashioning and 
effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity 
has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for 
adjusting and reconciling public and private needs.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 263. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1947 (2011) (using injunctive relief to impose 
prison-population limits to ensure prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights were protected). 
 264. See SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup I), 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (“But when a public agency asks a court to become its partner in enforcement by 
imposing wide-ranging injunctive remedies on a defendant, enforced by the formidable judicial 
power of contempt, the court, and the public, need some knowledge of what the underlying facts 
are . . . .”).  
 265. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 321–22 (1944). 
 266. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup IV), 752 F.3d 285, 289 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 267. Securities Act of 1933 § 20(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2012). 
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A long line of Supreme Court cases holds that, unless the 
governing statute contains express language circumscribing the 
discretion of district courts, the background principles of equity 
remain in force.268 The above language is far from the “inescapable 
inference” required by Warner Holding Co. to conclude that the 
discretion of the district court is in some way curtailed.269 In fact, in 
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.270 the Supreme Court held that the 
statutory language of the 1934 Act, substantially similar to that of the 
1933 Act, did not restrict courts’ discretion: “[W]e cannot fairly infer 
from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 a purpose to circumscribe 
the courts’ power to grant appropriate remedies.”271 
At the risk of trivializing this plain yet important point, the 
Supreme Court in Hecht held that, even when a statute uses more 
restrictive language, it is still entirely within a court’s purview to 
determine the propriety of injunctive relief.272 In addition, the Hecht 
Court specifically cited the 1933 and 1934 Acts as containing language 
that requires judicial discretion.273 Having thus established that the 
operative statutory language does not circumscribe the discretion of 
courts, it follows that “[t]he decision to grant or deny permanent 
injunctive relief is an act of equitable discretion by the district 
court.”274 The panel in Citigroup all but rejected this rule by vesting 
the primary consideration in equitable relief—the public interest—
with the SEC.275 A reviewing court under Citigroup is thus confined to 
reviewing the “procedural propriety” of the consent decree, and 
absent any irregularities must generally issue the injunction as 
sought.276 
Courts have a duty to independently assess the merits of a 
proposed consent decree.277 The court’s ultimate decision is to be 
 
 268. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–92 (2006); Porter v. Warner 
Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946); Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 330. 
 269. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. at 398. 
 270. Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). 
 271. Id. at 391. 
 272. Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 591. 
 273. Id. at 331 n.7. 
 274. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 275. See SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup IV), 752 F.3d 285, 296 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(“The job of determining whether the proposed SEC consent decree best serves the public 
interest, however, rests squarely with the SEC . . . .”). 
 276. Id. at 295–96. 
 277. Id. at 293; see Arizona v. City of Tucson, 761 F.3d 1005, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussing 
independent review in the context of CERCLA consent decrees); City of Detroit v. Grinnell 
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based on the entirety of the attendant circumstances278 and “all those 
considerations of fairness that have been the traditional concern of 
equity courts.”279 Further, courts have a “duty to inquire into the 
technical terms and factual disputes underlying the proposed 
settlement”280 and are compelled to “take genuine account of ‘the 
equities.’”281 It is thus plain that the Second Circuit’s preoccupation 
with procedural correctness, as opposed to substantive or factual 
propriety, is largely misplaced and incorrect as a matter of law. The 
topical considerations authorized by the court fall far short of the 
searching review that should, and traditionally has, characterized 
equitable practice. 
As a trial judge, Judge Rakoff was in the best possible position to 
view and assess the factual record. Presiding over the proceedings, 
Judge Rakoff was able to witness the candor and forthrightness of the 
parties. To borrow language from the Second Circuit, he was “on the 
firing line and [able to] evaluate the action accordingly.”282 
Conversely, the appeals panel had only a second-order view of the 
record that, from its lofty vantage point, it found it sufficient.283 The 
Second Circuit went so far as to say that short of collusion, district 
courts should be satisfied by the averments of the SEC alone.284 
Averments are, by definition, unproven.285 It is difficult to reconcile 
the long-standing requirement that courts satisfy themselves of the 
factual underpinnings of equitable relief and the position of the 
Second Circuit, which essentially asks courts to take the SEC at its 
word. 
 
Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 462 (2d Cir. 1974) (stating that courts are to “eschew any rubber stamp 
approval in favor of an independent evaluation”). 
 278. See SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 250 (2d Cir. 1959) (“The chancellor’s decision is 
based on all the circumstances . . . .”). 
 279. SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1102 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 280. United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 540 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (W.D.N.Y. 
1982). 
 281. FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 282. See Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d at 454 (“Great weight is accorded his [the trial judge’s] 
views because he is exposed to the litigants, and their strategies, positions and proofs. He is 
aware of the expense and possible legal bars to success. Simply stated, he is on the firing line 
and can evaluate the action accordingly.” (alteration in original) (quoting Ace Heating & 
Plumbing Co., Inc. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 43 (3d Cir. 1971))). 
 283. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup IV), 752 F.3d 285, 296 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 284. Id.  
 285. Averments, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2014) (defining averments as “positive 
declaration or affirmation of fact; esp., an assertion or allegation in a pleading” (emphasis 
added)).  
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As discussed in connection with Bonastia, a failure “to apply 
well-settled legal precepts to a conceded set of facts” is an abuse of 
discretion.286 The Second Circuit would lead one to believe this was 
the case in Citigroup. But as far as Judge Rakoff was concerned, there 
was no set of conceded facts. Judge Rakoff was thus doing little more 
than conducting his own independent factual analysis as called for by 
Hooker, and a much more limited inquiry at that.287 Had his factual 
questions been answered, he likely would have approved the 
settlement—this is precisely what occurred in SEC v. Bank of 
America.288 There, Judge Rakoff initially refused to enter a consent 
decree for want of facts, but, after receiving additional information 
from the parties, approved the settlement. Importantly, the 
admissions of the bank stopped short of admitting liability, thus 
foreclosing on collateral exposure and providing a model of what a 
factually robust settlement with Citi could have looked like.289 
By far the most shocking aspect of the Second Circuit’s opinion 
was the degree of deference afforded to the SEC in determining what 
satisfied the public interest.290 The court held unequivocally that 
“[t]he job of determining whether the proposed SEC consent decree 
best serves the public interest, however, rests squarely with the SEC, 
and its decisions merit significant deference.”291 This level of 
deference is akin to Chevron deference,292 and although Chevron 
deference might often be a safe harbor for agencies when engaged in 
rulemaking, it seems that the Second Circuit ceded too much judicial 
 
 286. SEC v. Bonastia, 614 F.2d 908, 913 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 287. See United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 540 F. Supp. 1067, 1071–72 
(W.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 288. See SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., Nos. 09 Civ. 6829 (JSR), 10 Civ. 0215 (JSR), 2010 WL 
624581, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010). 
 289. Id.; see Coffee, supra note 17, at 1 (discussing parallels between Citigroup and Bank of 
America). 
 290. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup IV), 752 F.3d 285, 297 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 291. Id. at 296. 
 292. Chevron deference is a two-step test applied to agency actions to determine whether 
the action is lawful. A court first asks whether Congress has spoken directly to the relevant 
question. If so, the court and the agency must adhere to the will of Congress. If Congress has 
not spoken directly to the issue however, the agency action will be upheld so long as it is based 
on a permissible reading of the statute. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
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authority to the SEC by extending Chevron-level deference to 
considerations of equity—the domain of courts.293 
The panel did itself a further disservice by relying on Chaney for 
the proposition that the SEC’s enforcement action was committed to 
the Commission’s discretion by law, and thus was unreviewable.294 
There the agency decision being challenged was the decision not to 
take enforcement action. As Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned, 
decisions not to act do not involve “coercive power” on the part of an 
agency. The situation in Citigroup was precisely the opposite: the 
SEC was acting affirmatively, and its request for injunctive relief does 
implicate coercive power over those areas traditionally protected by 
courts. The Second Circuit’s reliance on Chaney is not only mistaken, 
but also undermines its conclusion.295 
Many circuits have held that the most important factor in 
determining the degree of deference afforded to a party seeking 
approval of a consent decree is “the persuasive power of the agency’s 
proposal and rationale.”296 Apparently, the Second Circuit was so 
impressed by the strength of the SEC’s case that it felt it necessary to 
cede the bench’s most essential function to the SEC in this and all 
future cases.297 This is a remarkable result considering the lack of 
stipulations of fact.298 How can a trial judge be convinced of the 
relative strengths of the parties’ positions when there are no factual 
 
 293. See Chris Rice, Injunctive Relief and Judicial Deference, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 
(Apr. 8, 2012, 5:21 PM), http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12065 [http://perma.cc/3QQL-EHGN] 
(describing the misplaced reliance on Chevron). 
 294. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup IV), 752 F.3d 285, 297 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 295. See Rice, supra note 293. (“Heckler concerned a decision by an administrative agency 
not to pursue injunctive relief; while a request for injunctive relief involves the court’s 
conception of the public interest, the absence of such a request does not involve the court in the 
same way.”). 
 296. FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 407 (1st Cir. 1987); see EEOC v. 
Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 768 F.2d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that a district court should 
compare “the strengths of the plaintiffs’ case versus the amount of the settlement offer”); Walsh 
v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 726 F.2d 956, 966 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that the most 
important consideration in reviewing a settlement in the class-action context is whether the 
underlying claims could be proven); Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1173 (4th Cir. 1975) 
(stating that a court may approve a settlement when “the record before it is adequate to reach 
‘an intelligent and objective opinion of the probabilities of ultimate success should the claim be 
litigated’” (citation omitted)).  
 297. Citigroup IV, 752 F.3d at 296. 
 298. See SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup I), 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that the court cannot approve settlement due to lack of “proven 
or admitted facts”). 
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stipulations and the defendant neither admits nor denies the 
allegations? 
On this analysis, the Second Circuit relinquished a critical role of 
the judiciary to the SEC. The court rationalized that the SEC has a 
constituency, whereas courts do not.299 This reasoning is flawed for 
two reasons. First, the SEC’s Congressional “constituency” gave its 
mandate to the SEC through the operative language of the Act, which 
preserves the traditional role of the courts as the ultimate deciders of 
whether an equitable remedy is appropriate. Second, even if the Act 
is not read as explicitly preserving the courts’ role in this regard, the 
Framers nonetheless intended that courts act as a check on the whims 
of the executive and legislative branches. Excesses of Congress or the 
executive branch cannot be justified on the basis of their 
constituencies; the SEC has always had a Congressional constituency 
to which it must answer, there is nothing new or different in this case 
that justifies allowing the Commission to overstep its bounds. Not 
only is the ruling flawed and grounded in untenable justifications, but 
the decision has important, underanalyzed consequences moving 
forward. 
C. Implications of the Flawed Ruling 
A question that arises naturally from the Second Circuit’s 
decision is the degree of discretion that remains for courts in granting 
their judicial imprimatur after Citigroup. Another related question is 
whether there were any other courses of action Judge Rakoff could 
have taken to avoid issuing an injunction. 
As to the first question, the opinion in Citigroup makes clear that 
a reviewing court’s analysis should be limited to the procedural 
propriety of the consent decree.300 Other circuits have not winnowed 
the role of reviewing courts to such a degree, however, and leave a 
substantial basis for the conclusion that the role of courts is much 
broader. 
For example, the Hooker court recognized a duty to inquire into 
the factual underpinnings of a consent decree.301 Along those lines, 
the First Circuit in Standard Financial, the Fourth Circuit in Flinn v. 
 
 299. Citigroup IV, 752 F.3d at 296. 
 300. Id. at 295. 
 301. See United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 540 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 
(W.D.N.Y. 1982) (“[T]he reviewing court has a limited duty to inquire into the technical terms 
and the factual disputes underlying the proposed settlement.”). 
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FMC Corp.,302 and the Seventh Circuit in Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 
all state that an important factor for a reviewing judge to consider is 
the strength of the plaintiff’s case.303 Indeed, the Seventh Circuit 
regards it as the most important factor.304 Elsewhere, judges consider 
the substantive terms of consent decrees.305 Some courts go so far as to 
require that the consent decree “represents a reasonable factual and 
legal determination based on the facts of record, whether established 
by evidence, affidavit, or stipulation.”306 
A recent student case comment proposes a district-court 
standard of review restricted to “the adequacy of the individual 
settlement package.”307 At the same time, the author characterizes 
efforts to discern factual underpinnings as “overreaching.”308 This 
seems to be a logical inconsistency; how can a judge possibly assess 
the adequacy, or any aspect of a proposed consent decree, without 
facts by which to measure it? In order to accord with the rich history 
of equitable practice, and to allow judges the flexibility needed to 
effect just results, reviewing judges should be given wide latitude to 
inquire into the facts supporting a settlement. This is not to say they 
will or should do so in every case, only that they should be permitted 
to do so when they wish. For instance, courts might inquire into 
evidence against the defendant, the negotiation process and how 
settlement figures were calculated, how the SEC determined which 
charges to levy, and how the SEC plans to monitor and enforce any 
 
 302. Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1975). 
 303. See id. at 1172 (“The most important factor to be considered in determining whether 
there has been such a clear abuse of discretion is whether the trial court gave proper 
consideration to the strength of the plaintiffs’ claims on the merits . . . .”); FTC v. Standard Fin. 
Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 408 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[T]he true measure of the deference due 
depends on the persuasive power of the agency's proposal and rationale, given whatever 
practical considerations may impinge and the full panoply of the attendant circumstances.”); 
EEOC v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 768 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1985) (listing “a comparison of the 
strengths of plaintiffs’ case versus the amount of the settlement offer” as one of “the factors that 
a district court should consider” in determining the “fairness” of a consent decree). 
 304. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 768 F.2d at 889. 
 305. In re Tutu Water Wells CERCLA Litig., 326 F.3d 201, 207 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 306. United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 307. See Case Comment, Securities Regulation – Consent Decrees – Second Circuit Clarifies 
that a Court’s Review of an SEC Settlement Should Focus on Procedural Propriety. – SEC v. 
Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014), 128 HARV. L. REV. 1288, 1294 
(2015). This is an especially interesting suggestion given that the Second Circuit removed 
adequacy from the considerations of a district court in its decision. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. 
Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup IV), 752 F.3d 285, at 294 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 308. See Case Comment, supra note 307, at 1291 (“Judge Rakoff overreached in his demand 
that the SEC establish the ‘truth’ of the allegations against Citi.”). 
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penalties extracted. To equate attempts to determine the factual 
circumstances with admissions of liability mischaracterizes the 
inquiry. 
In response to the second question—alternative routes Judge 
Rakoff could have taken—Judge Rakoff could have approved the 
terms of the settlement less the injunctive elements.309 This conclusion 
is bolstered by United States v. City of Miami,310 in which the Fifth 
Circuit discussed hybrid consent judgments, those “based in part on 
the parties’ settlement agreement and in part on the court’s own 
judgment.”311 More generally, the Supreme Court’s announcement in 
Yakus that courts sitting in equity “go much further both to give and 
withhold relief” when the public interest is implicated than they do 
when only private interests are concerned also lends support to this 
idea.312 Admittedly, this result would have been a windfall for Citi, as 
its punishment would have been less severe without the injunctive 
elements, but it would have sent a powerful message to the SEC—“if 
a party seeks the legitimacy of the courts, it should be prepared to 
play by the courts’ rules.” In addition to rebuking the SEC, such a 
settlement would have deprived the SEC of nothing of practical value 
as the SEC seldom enforces its injunctions.313 
Of course, the SEC also had alternatives, the most obvious being 
a settlement with Citi outside of the courts. That the SEC did not 
choose this path means that it thinks that a court-approved settlement 
adds value to their enforcement, perhaps through the ostensible 
legitimacy conferred by a court. Without an independent judiciary, 
however, it is hard to see what substantive value a court might add. It 
 
 309. See Coffee, supra note 17, at 3 (arguing that if the SEC itself pursued a settlement 
without injunctions, it likely could extract higher monetary penalties). 
 310. United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 311. See id. at 440 (“Complete accord on all issues, however, is not indispensable to the 
entry of any order. Even in a two-party litigation the parties may agree on as much as they 
can . . . and call upon the court to decide the issues they cannot resolve. Thus, there may be a 
decree ‘partially consensual and partially litigated.’” (citations omitted) (quoting High v. Braniff 
Airways, Inc., 592 F.2d 1330, 1335 (5th Cir. 1979))). 
 312. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 441 (1944). 
 313. See Brief of Amici Curiae Securities Law Scholars for Affirmance in Support of the 
District Court’s Order and Against Appellant and Appellee, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. 
Inc., 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 11-5227-cv), 2012 WL 7009633, at *15 (“[T]he SEC rarely 
seeks to hold a defendant in contempt for breach of an injunction . . . .”); Coffee, supra note 17, 
at 3 (“Nor is it credible that injunctive relief is that important to the SEC . . . because the SEC 
never seeks to enforce its injunctions through contempt.”). 
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is plain that the SEC sought the legitimacy and imprimatur of the 
courts, yet did not wish to pay for it. 
CONCLUSION 
A court’s injunctive power should not be wielded casually.314 
When the SEC seeks to invoke the equitable power of courts, it ought 
to be prepared to justify its need with factual support.315 Contrary to 
what commentators and the SEC itself argued, this does not require 
an admission of liability and resulting collateral exposure.316 
In SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, the Second Circuit’s flawed 
decision restricted the role of judges reviewing consent decrees to 
ensuring that the proposed settlement is procedurally proper. 
Further, the Second Circuit gave excessive deference to the SEC and 
its determination of what constitutes the public interest. Because the 
public interest is the primary consideration in the decision to grant or 
deny equitable relief, the Second Circuit relegated courts to the role 
of mere seconders to the whims of agencies. In so holding, the Second 
Circuit rejected precedent and violated separation-of-powers 
principles. 
Such a decision not only weakens the power of the judiciary to 
effectively police ineffective enforcement by agencies, but also serves 
to undermine the enforcement of the securities laws. Instead of 
deferring to the SEC, courts should be granted discretion to inquire 
into the factual underpinnings of government settlements when those 
settlements make use of judicial imprimatur. The goal of efficient 
capital aggregation and allocation is only furthered by effective and 
meaningful enforcement of the securities laws. The trivialization of 
courts in this goal serves only to trivialize the goal itself. 
 
 314. See SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1978) (explaining 
that “collateral consequences of an injunction can be very grave” and describing judicial 
reticence to issue injunctions); see also United States v. Local 1804-1, Int’l Longshoremen’s 
Ass’n, 44 F.3d 1091, 1095 (2d Cir. 1995) (describing contempt as “among the most formidable 
weapons in the court's arsenal”). 
 315. See Coffee, supra note 17, at 4 (stating that “courts should seek a full explanation of the 
enforcement agency’s reasoning and should have some factual understanding of the strength of 
the case before imposing injunctive relief”). Professor Coffee helpfully illustrates a “semantic 
bridge,” between the goals of airing adequate factual support and avoiding the effects of 
collateral estoppel. Id. at 1. He points to the Bank of America and Goldman Sachs settlements 
as evidence of such a viable middle ground. Id. at 2. 
 316. Id. at 4.  
